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Executive Summary 
The dam of Mosul on the Tigris river in northern Iraq is the largest in the country and 
holds around 11 km3 of water. Built on water permeable rock, the inherent instability of 
the Mosul dam has been known since it was built and this was mitigated by continuous 
grouting. In recent years adequate maintenance has not taken place, leading to concerns 
about the safety of the dam. In 2003 the government decided to lower the maximum 
water level from 330 to 319 metres.  During the recent conflict, maintenance has again 
been disrupted and signs at the dam have triggered renewed concerns, highlighted in the 
Schnabel report. As a result, the government of Iraq have contracted the Italian 
engineering company Trevi to undertake remedial work on the dam. This work is scheduled 
to start later in the Spring of 2016. 
In late February 2016 the Iraqi government advised the residents of Mosul to move at 
least 5 km away from the river in case of breach. A UN mission of UNDAC experts left for 
Iraq in early April to assess the situation, supported by an associated expert from the 
European Union Civil Protection Mechanism.  
A number of studies have been devoted to the possible effects of a failure of the dam. In 
this study we perform a number of medium-resolution (180m) dynamic hydraulic 
simulations starting from various constant percentages of destruction of the dam and 
allowing the corresponding quantity of water (supposing the lake to be at its highest level) 
to flow downslope for periods of 6 and 12 days. Compared to previous studies we provide 
in addition a complete timescale of the water flow progression, detailed maps of the water 
depth and extent in the affected cities’ areas and focus more on the numbers of population 
affected by various water depths. 
The main scenario analysed in this study, where the dam is 26% destroyed, the level of 
the lake is at its maximum value of 330m, and most of the lake’s water is allowed to flow 
out fast, results in a very high wave of water (in places 25m high, mean height around 
12m) arriving at Mosul city after 1h40min. The capital Baghdad is reached after about 
3.5 days with a max water height of 8m and a mean of around 2m. 
The simulations suggest that in the above scenario a total of more than 6 million people 
(close to one sixth of the country’s population) will be affected by floodwaters, with two 
million of them facing water of more than 2m. Water heights of more than 10m would 
inundate an area with 270 000 people, most of them in Mosul city and its surroundings, 
whose lives, houses and infrastructure would risk complete destruction. 
A number of other scenarios involving lower initial levels of the lake are also analysed, 
considering levels of 319m (the current one), and 315, 309, 307, 305 and 300m. 
Significant reductions in the affected populations and later arrival times are seen for lower 
initial lake levels. The differences are quite prominent in Mosul as well as in Baghdad, 
where we also provide detailed maps of the inundation in the various cases. The scenario 
of part of the flood wave being diverted to lake Tharthar by an existing channel near 
Samarra is also examined in detail. 
These results are a first-order approximation, favouring speed of calculation over detail 
for a rapid assessment; it is planned to refine them later using higher resolution ground 
elevation data (that take much longer to run) and more detailed, time-dependent 
scenarios of dam failure. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Basic dam information 
The dam of Mosul was constructed between 1981 and 1986 in northern Iraq. It dams the 
river Tigris, forming an artificial lake that holds 11.1 km3 of water at full capacity and its 
primary function is to control water flow in the Tigris river. It is located 40km NW of the 
city of Mosul and its primary function is to supply electricity to the city’s 1.7 million 
inhabitants. It is the largest dam in Iraq, measuring 2km in length and 113m in height. It 
is an earth-fill embankment-type dam with a clay core.  
 
 
Figure 1: The dam of Mosul (Google Earth, 2010) 
1.2 Dam instability 
Concerns about the dam’s stability and safety began already during construction: because 
the dam is built on a foundation of gypsum, anhydrite and limestone, i.e. water-soluble 
minerals, water can seep under the dam and compromise its stability, posing the risk of 
catastrophic failure (Al-Ansari et al 2015 and references therein – Ref. 1). To avoid this, 
continuous maintenance has taken place since the dam’s opening, in the form of grouting: 
new leaks are plugged by injecting a cement mixture into the compromised spots. This 
ad-hoc solution in itself is not deemed satisfactory, since grouting at one location causes 
the seepage of subsurface water to move to another location but does not stop it (Ref. 2).  
In any case, most of this maintenance was stopped in 2014, after the area was taken over 
by the forces of the so-called Daesh. Later in 2014 the area passed again under the control 
of the Peshmerga, the military forces of the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan, but the 
maintenance has not been fully restarted and fears about the dam’s stability have 
multiplied. According to media reports, the grouting machines have been damaged and 
there is no cement supply, and even the gates of the overflow spillway (visible on the right 
of the dam in the photo above) are malfunctioning (Ref. 3). Moreover, as spring advances, 
the water level is expected to increase from snowmelt, increasing further the pressure on 
the dam. Another possible threat that has been mentioned is deliberate destruction of part 
of the dam as a warfare act; this scenario was invoked primarily during the 2003 Gulf war. 
In early March 2016 it was announced (Ref. 4) that the Iraqi government had awarded a 
contract to a European company to resume maintenance and guarding of the dam. It is 
not clear, however, when the works would actually start. The Iraqi government also 
announced an experts’ mission to assess the dam’s stability in late February. (Ref. 5) 
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Despite many warnings and studies indicating the possible instability of the dam, the 
official stance of local officials until recently has been reassuring, claiming that the risks 
were exaggerated (Ref. 3). In late February, however, this was reversed, with the Iraqi 
Prime Minister advising the population of Mosul to move at least 5km away from the Tigris’ 
river bed in the case of failure (Ref. 6). 
 
1.4 Past studies of flood effects by dam failure 
The most detailed study until of the possible mechanisms and eventual effects by failure 
of the Mosul Dam until this day remains the one of Swiss Consultants in 1984, summarised 
in Ref. 1. In that study a number of dam failure models were developed, based on a 
progressive breach of various widths and most of the water of the reservoir was emptied 
in 6 to 8 hours after the initial breach. Most interesting to compare with this present paper 
is the tracing of the wave downstream. Those results of 1984 can be summarised as 
follows: 
- The initial height of the wave is 55m, decreasing to 45m after the first 20km. 
- Mosul city will be affected by the flood 4 hours after the breach; the maximum wave 
height will be 24m and it will inundate 74 km2 of the Mosul city area. 
- The city of Tikrit will be reached after 22h and the maximum height will be 15m, 
inundating 69 km2. 
- Northern Baghdad will be reached after 38 hours and central Baghdad after 44 hours, 
with a wave of 4m. A total of 217 km2 will be inundated. 
No detailed affected population numbers have been calculated in this study; rough 
estimates in the media mention around 500 000 people in direct risk of loss of life. 
A preliminary study (Ref. 9) on the Mosul dam failure inundation on a much shorter time 
scale was carried out in early March 2016 by the Institute of Environment and 
Sustainability of the Joint Research Centre. In this 2-dimensional hydraulic modeling at 
low resolution, it was calculated that 4.7 million people would be affected, an area of 7,700 
square km would be inundated and Mosul would face a mean flood depth of 9.8m affecting 
200 000 people. 
Another study by Thair et al (Ref. 10) consider a time for the creation of the break. The 
break time is up to about 4h in the case of 330 m a.s.l.; in this study we assumed an 
instantaneous opening, in order to assess a worst-case scenario.  
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2 Hydraulic calculations varying the break size  
A number of calculations has been performed in order to estimate the dam break 
propagation from the Mosul dam into the downstream valley in the 6 days following the 
break event. The calculations have been performed using the HyFlux2 computer code, 
developed at the JRC (Ref. 7) and routinely used for Tsunami and Storm surge events but 
originally developed to analyse dam break problems. 
In order to execute the calculations some 
preliminary analysis of the topography and 
retrieval of dam characteristics have been 
performed: using those data we proceeded to 
determine the original topography of the 
valley where the dam was built (i.e. without 
the lake’s water) and definition of the break 
characteristics.  
The original topography has been obtained by the publication of Elias Issa (Ref. 8) that is 
reporting the results of a bathymetric survey in the lake performed in 2011. Unfortunately, 
it was not possible to contact the author and therefore we have used the image below in 
order to obtain the elevation above the sea level of the lake bottom, i.e. the original 
topography without the lake. the current better available topography, i.e. SRTM 90 m, 
consider the lake at an elevation of 307-310 m. We considered the elevation of the lake 
at 330m that is the maximum normal operational water elevation (and thus taking the 
worst-case scenario as far as water volume is concerned). 
 
Figure 2: Lake bathymetry (from Issa 2015) 
From the figure above the dam bottom topography has been obtained, resampled at 90m 
and substituted to the STRM90 in the area of the lake.  The dam break has been simulated 
by considering a reduction of pixels in the topography so that water could flow out of the 
lake. 
The following figure represents the topography of the dam valley with the dam simulated. 
To simulate the break, a few pixels of those that play the role of the dam (red squares in 
the figure) have been substituted by lower pixels in order to allow a direct connection 
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between the lake and the descending section located at 252 m with a jump of 78 m from 
the lake top, assumed at 330 m. 
Considering that the dam to be 2 km long and 78m high (measured from the level of the 
river), for a total of 156000 m2 the assumed break area is about 26% of the total area and 
is as high as the total height of the dam. 
 
 
 
 
Lake Bathymetry as obtained for this study 
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Break simulation 
252 m 
330 m 
Figure 4: Dam breach representation 
Figure 3: Dam breach profile 
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The above break can be considered a large one, as the total elimination of the whole dam 
from top to bottom might not be realistic. For a sensitivity analysis, a case with 60% area 
break was run; the results of this 60% break are not very different from the ones of 26%, 
used in the rest of the study. A case with a strong reduction of this area was also run, with 
an area of only 7% limited to the upper part of the dam, to simulate a deliberate explosion. 
The results of the 26% case here are therefore considered representative of a rather 
severe break. Indicative results and maps resulting from the other scenarios are given in 
Appendix I. 
Results of the dam break event (26% break) 
The propagation of the water flow is indicated in the time sequence below for the 6 days 
of the simulation. The simulation was run using 10 cores on a Linux machine with a 
resolution of 180 m per each cell and took about 24 h of CPU time. 
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Figure 5: Time evolution maps of the water flow. 
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Figure 6: Overview map of water flow and travel time (Initial lake level: 330 m) 
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The progression of the flow in the valley occurs following the average local slope. At the 
beginning, when the slope is higher the speed is quite large, in the order of 40 km/h. The 
speed then decreases and finally almost stops in Baghdad where a very flat area exists. 
As can be seen also from the plot below, at the various cities upstream of Baghdad the 
water is kept high but for much shorter periods, while in this last city the height of the 
water is lower but stays for much longer. The flow progression can be visualised as an 
animation in this URL: http://goo.gl/6CT5ig   
Item Height 
(metres 
a.s.l) 
Distance 
(km)1 
Slope 
(%) 
Average 
speed 
(km/h) 
Time of 
wave 
arrival 
(h)2 
Time of 
max 
height (h) 
Max 
Height 
(m) 
Dam break 252 0 -  0 0 78 
Mosul 217 69  -0.05 40. 1.7 6.2 26.4 
Bayji 109 180   -0.06 11. 16.8 23.5 14.3 
Tikrit 89 47 -0.04 11. 21.0 26.5 14.4 
Samarra 66 54 -0.04 18. 25.8 30.8 16.1 
Bagdad 38 108 -0.03 2.6 67.0 117.0 7.9 
 
 
Figure 7: Water height versus time for the lake and for the major cities downstream. 
  
                                           
1 Distance between two points 
2 Time of arrival is considered at the city centre. In the case of Baghdad the periphery is 
reached a few hours earlier 
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2.1 Affected population 
For population calculations in this section we use the same scenario as above, i.e. 
maximum initial lake level of 330m. To obtain numbers for the population affected by 
the flood wave we superimposed the maximum water height maps of the above analysis 
on the LANDSCAN 2014 Global Population Database, with a resolution of approximately 
1km2. Altough SRTM 90m is the best complete available topography layer (Sentinel data 
are sparse for this region), it is important to mention that the in some areas there could 
be local errors which could affect the flood depth and flood extent, therefore the maps 
should be used with caution and always considering real ground conditions. In the 
estimation of the population possibly affected current refugee camps and displaced people 
are not included and may be included, if available, in a future revision of this document. 
The floodwave raster was binned in 5 water height classes, with these limit values: 0.1m, 
0.5m, 2m, 5m, 10m. Any area with more than 0.1m of water we consider to be affected 
by flooding. The total population and area affected by the different water heights is given 
in the table below: 
 
The total population affected by floodwaters higher than 0.1m is a little over 6 million 
people or a very significant 16% of the total population of Iraq. The flooded area is 
close to 2% of the country’s total surface.  
A sub-total of more than half a million people would be exposed to floodwaters of 
more than 5m high, thus having their lives at immediate peril; a large percentage of 
those would have less than two hours warning time, as will be shown below. 
Moreover, a very significant surface area will be inundated, with subsequent destruction 
of critical infrastructure, houses, crops and all livelihood. The cost of the damage is not 
easy to calculate, but it is easy to understand that the scale of the disaster would be 
enormous and the economic impact in the country and the whole region would be 
impossible to bear. 
We repeated the above calculation for the greater areas (5 – 10 km from the city centre) 
of five major cities along the Tigris river and the results are shown in the Table below. 
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The lower part of the Table gives the time for the arrival of the first volume of water, that 
of the maximum height (that in general has a significant delay of at least a few hours with 
respect to the first wave) and the maximum water height in meters. (These figures are 
copied and rounded from the table with the detailed results of the simulations in the 
previous Section). 
It is worthwhile to comment further on the case of Mosul – the reader is also referred to 
the detailed map of the inundation in each of the above cities, in Appendix I. There are a 
few  points to highlight: 
1. The city is built on either side of Tigris, with densely inhabited neighbourhoods 
close to the river. As a result, a very large number of people will be exposed to 
prodigious heights of floodwater: 183 000 people, more than 10% of the city’s 
population of 1.7 million will be affected by more than 10m wave height, which 
could mean complete destruction. 
2. The warning time will be very short; even if a dam breach is signalled 
immediately, within 3 hours the water height in Mosul will have already reached 
close to 20m (see the graph with depth and time reached in the previous chapter). 
Evacuation of almost 250 000 people from the banks of Tigris in a few hours is very 
difficult to accomplish. 
3. Due to the ground morphology, as can also be seen in the map in Appendix I, the 
water level drops sharply at around 4 km away from the river bed. A possible 
evacuation, therefore, would have to be carried out at this distance; the value of 
4-5km agrees well with that recommended by the Iraqi government in March 2016. 
4. The value for the maximum wave height in Mosul in these calculations is in good 
agreement with the values estimated in the study of Swiss Consultants in 1984 
(24m). The time of arrival is also in good agreement: SC gave a value of 4h for a 
wave of 24m, while we give 3 hours for 20m and 6 hours for the maximum of 26m. 
Significant damage and loss of life should also be expected in the other cities along the 
river, with very high water levels of more than 10m present. It is interesting to notice that 
in Samarra, a long way downriver, the maximum height is actually larger than that of 
Tikrit, higher upstream. 
In Baghdad, heights of up to 8m were shown by the calculations in a few places; the mean 
value in the Baghdad greater area, however, is quite lower, at around 2m. More than 1 
million people would be exposed to depths of 2-5m. What is worrying in this case, as can 
be seen in the height-time graph in the previous section, is that the floodwaters take much 
longer to drain away from the Baghdad area, owing to the flat ground morphology. 
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3 Sensitivity Analysis on the initial Lake Level 
On request of the UNDAC team onsite a number of additional calculations have been 
performed in order to assess the effect of the lake level reduction on the inundation depth 
and extent. The initial break size was kept as the intermediate case (26% of the total 
area) as we saw no large differences with the 60% break and because we considered 
unrealistic a complete or partly complete destruction of the dam. 
The following cases have been considered from 300 m (minimum operational level for the 
power plant) to 330 m (the base case maximum): 
Elevation 
(m a.s.l.) 
Initial 
Volume 
(km3) 
Final 
Volume 
(km3) 
Discharged 
Volume 
(km3) 
330 9.6 0.5 9.1 
319 5.9 0.5 5.4 
309 3.6 0.5 3.1 
307 3.3 0.5 2.8 
305 2.9 0.5 2.4 
300 2.2 0.5 1.7 
 
The reduction of the initial water level strongly reduces the amount of water that is 
discharged in case of break from about 9.1 to 1.7 cubic km; the release time is increased 
from 12 to 21 hours3. 
The effect on the maximum water height and arrival time can be seen in the following 
tables and plots.  
The effect of the reduction on the maximum height is more evident in Mosul rather than 
in Baghdad, where the maximum height remains unchanged but the larger effect is on the 
extent of the flooding as lowering the initial height the flooded area is largely reduced, 
consistently with the reduction in the discharged volume. The highest lake area cases will 
be extended beyond 6 days while all the other cases have been run for 12 days. 
Appendix B reports all the maps related to these cases. The map below shows the variation 
of the inundated areas in Baghdad by increasing the lake height. It is possible to note the 
larger inundation that takes place as the lake height is increased.  On the right of the map 
the arrival times are also shown and it is possible to note how the lake height reduction 
tends to move the arrow related to 1 day to northern area, which means that the time for 
arriving to the various locations increases. 
The tables after the next map indicate the 
population and area affected by varying 
the lake level. As a whole, from 6.2 million 
people globally affected the population 
globally affected reduces to 2.2 million, 
thus at least 1/3 of the population 
affected by the largest height. The figure 
on the right indicates the overall 
population as a function of the lake 
height. 
  
                                           
3 Release time is difficult to establish because the level is decreasing exponentially. We 
consider arbitrarily as the time at which the level is smaller than 1m 
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Maximum Height 
Lake Elevation Mosul Banyji Tikrit Samarra Bagdad 
330 26.3 14.3 14.5 16.1 8.0 
319 22.7 11.8 11.8 13.8 7.6 
309 19.2 9.3 9.5 11.1 7.5 
307 18.6 8.9 9.1 10.4 7.4 
305 17.9 8.3 8.7 9.9 7.3 
300 16.0 7.3 7.8 8.3 7.1 
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Arrival times  
Lake Elevation Mosul Banyji Tikrit Samarra Bagdad 
330 1:40 16:56 21:08 26.12 76:15 
319 2:29 18:59 24:07 30.05 76:20 
309 2:55 22:54 29:00 36.48 96:40 
307 2:54 23:45 30:04 38.12 103:05 
305 3:17 24:53 31:19 40.12 111:31 
300 3:40 28:32 35:58 46.18 141:33 
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4 Role of the connecting channel between Samarra and Tharthar 
Lake 
After the performance of the previous calculations, the preliminary assessment by the UN 
team onsite with the local authorities pointed out that in the calculations the presence of 
the connecting channel between Samarra, at the location where a dam on the Tigris river 
is located and the Tharthar Lake was not considered. The presence of this channel could, 
in principle, relieve the amount of water coming from the Mosul dam reservoir in the 
direction of Baghdad, diverting it towards the lake and thus reducing the inundation of the 
Baghdad plane. According to local engineers the maximum flow in this channel is in the 
order of 30 000 m3/s, which however seems not realistic. 
For these reasons, and due to the fact that the newly decided lake level was decreased 
from 319 to 315 m, it was decided to perform additional calculations taking into account 
this additional detail. 
4.1 The channel 
The channel in question is visible in the image below obtained by Google Earth. The length 
of the channel is about 77 km and the width ranges between 40 and 130 m, as indicated 
in the image. The height drops from 62 to 44 m, i.e. 18 m for an average slope of 0.23 % 
and a max slope of about 2%. 
 
 
  
Samar
ra 
Tharthar 
Lake 
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The image below shows the point where the channel starts, Qulah Town. On the left a 
Hydropower dam creates the lake but after the dam a jump of about 10 m is present which 
means that (considering the flood wave height at this location of about 8 m) the dam does 
not offer a great protection for the locations downstream, and most of the water would 
naturally flow on the left, toward Baghdad. On the right lies the entrance to the channel 
in question towards Tharthar lake, which flows for a long distance at the same elevation 
(62-64 m) before losing large part of the 18 m in the last part of its trajectory. 
 
The image below shows superimposed the inundation corresponding to 319m of Lake 
elevation to show that all this area is largely inundated. It is however not clear how much 
water tends to flow towards Baghdad and how much would be spilled away through the 
channel. 
  
 
Baghdad Tharthar Lake 
Dam 
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The Samarra dam is constructed with a wall of about 10m and it is not clear how much is 
the height of the dam above the normal water level upstream. We assumed it to be in the 
order of 2 m. 
 
 
 
 
  
Towards 
Lake 
Tharthar 
Towards 
Baghdad 
  
 
28 
4.2 Modelling of the channel 
The original SRTM bathymetry (90m) does not show clearly the presence of the channel 
even if the overall plane is present. In order to maximize the flow from the channel towards 
the lake, the channel has been modelled considering the original path, a continuous 
decreasing elevation from 64 to 44 m and including walls of maximum height 64 m to 
contain the water in the channel.  
 
 
The width of the channel is 2 pixels (184x2=368 m) which is much more than in reality 
but we wanted to be sure that the water could flow even at this resolution. The presence 
Channel 
Lake Tharthar 
Bagdhad Plane 
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of the walls (red in the figure above) is important to avoid that part of the water could 
flow down on the right, as indicated by the yellow arrow in the previous figure.  
In order to prevent an immediate flow towards Baghdad, the dam has been raised by 2 m 
above the initial water level but given the very high flow and velocity some doubts exist 
that this dam could resist the large moment of water arriving. Nevertheless, it was 
maintained for the whole calculation. 
4.3 Dam break calculations with the channel simulated and 
with 315 m initial lake elevation  
In order to understand the various overall 
water movements, the calculation space has 
been subdivided in 5 zones, as indicated in the 
figure on the right.  
The results of the calculations are reported in 
terms of volume in each section and 
derivative of the volume, i.e. the volumetric 
flow change per second. For volumes with 
only one connection like Mosul lake, South 
Samarra and Tharthar Lake this quantity 
represents the flow inlet while for North of 
Samarra and the channel it represents the 
inlet/outlet difference.  
It is interesting to note that the Lake 
discharges a huge initial flow, i.e. 89000 m3/s, 
the inlet flow into the South of Samarra has 
an inflow peaking at 35000 m3/s and therefore 
the channel, whole maximum flow is 3.4 m3/s, 
is insufficient to prevent the inundation of the 
district South of Samarra. 
After the first hours however the channel can 
relief less and less and at the end of the 
transient condition the Tharthar lake will 
absorb only 0.3 km3 against 3.9 km3 of South 
Samarra. 
Even if the modelling of the channel could be improved with a more detailed medullisation 
of the flow, we don’t think that the flow rate should be much larger than what indicated. 
One should also consider that the size of the channel is in reality much narrower than what 
here assumed.  
Further maps below show the difference in the inundation between the case with or without 
the contribution of the relief channel. It is obvious to consider that any further increase of 
the initial water level would probably increase the amount of water travelling in the channel 
but at the same time the flow to South of Samarra is even larger; again, we do not expect 
a large contribution of this channel to relieving the water volume flowing toward Baghdad.  
Mosul Lake 
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Volumes in the various areas (km3) 
Time (h) Mosul 
Lake 
North 
Samarra 
Channel Lake 
Tharthar 
South 
Samarra 
0 4.85 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12 0.98 3.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24 0.68 4.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
36 0.61 3.69 0.15 0.00 0.00 
48 0.58 2.06 0.20 0.00 1.55 
60 0.56 1.24 0.24 0.00 2.55 
72 0.54 0.83 0.22 0.06 3.07 
84 0.53 0.62 0.18 0.12 3.35 
96 0.53 0.51 0.15 0.17 3.50 
108 0.52 0.44 0.12 0.20 3.59 
120 0.52 0.39 0.10 0.23 3.66 
132 0.51 0.36 0.09 0.25 3.70 
144 0.51 0.33 0.08 0.26 3.74 
156 0.51 0.31 0.07 0.27 3.77 
168 0.51 0.30 0.06 0.28 3.79 
180 0.51 0.28 0.05 0.29 3.81 
192 0.50 0.27 0.05 0.29 3.82 
204 0.50 0.26 0.05 0.30 3.84 
216 0.50 0.26 0.04 0.30 3.85 
228 0.50 0.25 0.04 0.30 3.86 
 
Volumetric flow in the areas (inflow-outflow, m3/s) 
Time (h) Mosul 
Lake 
North 
Samarra 
Channel Lake 
Tharthar 
South 
Samarra 
0.0      
12.0 -89611.5 91239.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
24.0 -7036.7 7868.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
36.0 -1638.0 -14490.8 3397.7 0.0 44.6 
48.0 -761.5 -37812.9 1314.6 0.0 35803.5 
60.0 -448.3 -18940.9 780.3 2.9 23219.7 
72.0 -295.0 -9530.3 -422.3 1283.0 11915.4 
84.0 -211.4 -4810.9 -829.3 1411.7 6461.3 
96.0 -160.7 -2636.1 -788.8 1153.7 3606.5 
108.0 -124.2 -1598.2 -621.5 857.2 2166.5 
120.0 -98.6 -1086.2 -468.9 621.3 1434.7 
132.0 -80.9 -778.5 -353.5 451.4 1074.0 
144.0 -68.3 -590.3 -263.6 328.7 812.3 
156.0 -57.8 -456.1 -203.0 245.3 659.0 
168.0 -49.4 -362.5 -161.1 191.4 527.0 
180.0 -42.5 -298.4 -126.4 147.7 420.1 
192.0 37.0 -248.6 -95.8 111.2 364.0 
204.0 -32.5 -212.0 -75.8 86.4 303.3 
216.0 -28.0 -185.8 -60.8 68.3 258.9 
228.0 -24.7 -160.1 -51.6 55.7 232.3 
 
 
 
 
 
Note the effect of the dam: 
the channel is filling but no 
water is still going to 
South Samarra 
This is the only period 
in which the channel is 
active and can absorb 
water. Once the flow is 
passed the channel 
empties 
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Flow depth at the positions identified below 
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3 
1 
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4.4 Overall results of all the cases, including the 315 m   
 
Maximum Height 
Lake Elevation Mosul Bayji Tikrit Samarra Bagdad 
330 26.3 14.3 14.5 16.1 8.0 
319 22.7 11.8 11.8 13.8 7.6 
315 21.1 10.6 10.8 13.2 7.5 
Channel 315 = = = = 7.5 
309 19.2 9.3 9.5 11.1 7.5 
307 18.6 8.9 9.1 10.4 7.4 
305 17.9 8.3 8.7 9.9 7.3 
300 16.0 7.3 7.8 8.3 7.1 
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Arrival times (hours) 
Lake Elevation Mosul Banyji Tikrit Samarra Bagdad 
330 1:40 16:56 21:08 26.12 76:15 
319 2:29 18:59 24:07 30.05 76:20 
315 2:35 20.19 25:50 32.13 83.30 
Channel 315 = = = = 83.52 
309 2:55 22:54 29:00 36.48 96:40 
307 2:54 23:45 30:04 38.12 103:05 
305 3:17 24:53 31:19 40.12 111:31 
300 3:40 28:32 35:58 46.18 141:33 
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The affected population figures in the scenario where the existence of the channel leading 
to the Tharthar lake is included in the simulations. The last column marked with an asterisk 
(*) is the figures in Baghdad not considering the channel, given here for comparison. It 
can be seen that the difference is quite small. 
In the column with the area affected, the two first classes (0.1-0.5m and 0.5-2m) are left 
empty since the area of lake Tharthar would enter in these classes, rendering them too 
large and quite meaningless. 
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Time=1d 9 h 
 
The water accumulates at 
Samarra dam 
 
Time=1 d 12 h 
 
Water overpasses the dam 
and starts to flow towards 
Baghdad and towards the lake 
 
Time=1 d 16 h 
 
The amount of water flowing 
towards Baghdad is definitely 
much larger than the one 
going towards the lake 
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Time=2d 17 h 
When the lake is reached, 
most of the Baghdad plane is 
already flooded. 
This animation is available at:  http://goo.gl/RrlhWe ; the map below indicates the 
comparison with and without the channel. There is only a small area (in red) that is 
inundated more if the channel is not included but the large part of Baghdad is inundated 
in both cases. 
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5 Conclusions 
In this study we present numerical simulations of the flood wave following a breach of the 
Mosul dam, long known to be potentially unstable due to the water-permeable ground in 
which it was built. A few scenarios were run, within the time-limits set by this rapid-
assessment report, considering the worst case scenario of a full reservoir and varying the 
percentage of dam surface destruction. Most conclusions are drawn from the case where 
the lake is at its maximum level of 330m and 26% of the dam is destroyed; while larger 
break percentages don’t show siginficant differences. The focus of this study is the time-
evolution and the characteristics of the flood wave and its effects on the population on the 
banks of the river Tigris. 
Our calculations show the following: 
1. The floodwave will reach the city of Mosul in less than two hours, it will attain 
heights of more than 20m in around 3hours and its maximum height at the city, 
26m, after 6 hours. An area housing about 180 000 people, almost 10% of the 
city’s population, would be exposed to a floodwave of more than 10m, thus risking 
complete annihilation. 
2. The water wil continue downstream, having still a very significant height that is 
only slowly reduced and affect a total of about 6 million people. A total of more 
than 500 000 people (including Mosul) would be exposed to floodwaves of more 
than 5 metres in height. An area of 7 200 square km would be inundated, with a 
huge economic and social cost. 
3. According to these simulations, in the case of Mosul, an evacuation within 4 to 5 
km from the river would be advisable. 
4. Our results are in good agreement with results of previous studies. Here we add a 
detailed time profile of the floodwave’s height and an up-to-date estimate of the 
affected population using GIS. We also provide detailed maps of the potentially 
affected cities. 
5. The analysis of the presence of the connecting channel between Samarra and 
Thartar lake indicates that the maximum relief flow through this channel (that was 
not initially considered), does not have a significant influence; the inundation of 
Baghdad takes place approximately at the same extent with or without the channel.  
Further analyses have been performed by varying the initial lake height in order to identify 
the effect of the lake height reduction on the maximum flow depth and the extent of 
inundation and affected population. The results show that the lake height reduction 
plays a very important role in the reduction of both quantities and also in the 
times elongation so that more time is available for the population to evacuate 
from the possibly affected areas: as a matter of fact the arrival time in Bagdhad 
increases from 3 to 6 days by reducing the lake height from 330 to 300 m with obvious 
improvements in the possible consequences. 
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6 Limitations and Uncertainties in this study 
There are a number of factors that can influence the numerical results and the conclusions 
of this study. These should always be kept in mind when considering the results, and 
especially if life-or-death decisions are to be taken based on them. Uncertainties and errors 
can be introduced by the following factors. 
1. Errors in the elevation data and low resolution of the ground topography: In this 
study we used ground data of 180m resolution that can “smooth out” particular 
ground features. This can also affect the times and depths reported for the flood 
wave. The authors expect to be able to run simulations of higher resolution (that 
are quite time-consuming) in the near future. 
2. Errors in the data and changes in the population numbers: In the first draft of this 
study we used the population data of LANDSCAN 2014 with a rather low resolution 
of around 1 km2 and we continued using this set for consistency. More importantly, 
this data set cannot possibly take into account recent population movements 
caused by warfare. The population data we give should be considered under these 
restrictions. Future modelling would use more detailed population data sets 
recently made available, such as the Global Human Settlement Layer (GHSL). 
3. Modelling of the dam failure: As mentioned in the text, these simulations model 
the dam break to be almost instantaneous; it might be more realistic to introduce 
a gradual failure, as has been done in other studies. This would lower the maximum 
flood-wave height and the arrival time of this maximum (but would have lesser 
effects on the inundation extent). It is not the intention of this study to model the 
dam break with precision, but rather to estimate the affected population in a rapid-
assessment manner. 
4. The lake bathymetry was deduced by digitising a raster image in the study of Issa 
(2015). A more precise bathymetry would render the water volumes and the flow-
out times more accurate. 
5. The modelling of the connecting channel between Samarra and the Lake should be 
done by including the right dimensions whcih are not well known at the moment.  
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7 Appendix I: Different scenarios of dam failure 
  
 
7% Case 
 
Only the 
upper 
part of 
the dam 
is broken 
for a 
length of 
about 
500 m 
 
26% 
deep 
 
The dam 
is broken 
down to 
the 
bottom 
but to a 
limited 
horizontal 
extent 
 
Figure 8: Dam failure profiles for the different scenarios run. The dam is seen face-on. 
60% 
deep 
 
The dam 
is largely 
broken all 
the way 
to the 
bottom 
part 
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Figure 9: Height-Depth graph for the lake, for the three scenarios: 7% damage (blue), 26% damage 
(brown), 60% damage (red) 
 
 
Figure 10: Height-Time graph for Mosul, for the three scenarios: 7% damage (blue), 26% damage 
(brown), 60% damage (red) 
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Figure 11: Height-Time graph for Baghdad, for the three scenarios: 7% damage (blue), 26% 
damage (brown), 60% damage (red) 
 
 7% break 26% break 60% break 
ORIGINAL LAKE VOLUME 
(km3) 
9.6  9.6 9.6 
Residual Volume After Break 3.2 0.5 0.5 
LOST WATER VOLUME 6.4 9.1 9.1 
 
The table above shows that the final amount of water expelled in the 28 and 60% cases is the same, 
while the one with 7% is 30% less; the emptying time is also much longer and this explains the 
much smaller dynamic and final height in Baghdad. 
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Figure 12: Comparison of the inundation maps for two scenarios: 7% (blue) and 26% damage 
(orange area). 
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8 Appendix II: Inundation maps of major cities 
These maps show the flood wave height contours superimposed on maps of the cities. All 
maps in this Appendix use the results of the 26% damage scenario with the maximum 
initial level of the lake, 330m. Background data were extracted from OpenStreetMap 
(OSM). We used the city’s streets and (where enough data were available) the land-use 
classification to indicate the approximate extent of the inhabited urban areas. As inhabited 
areas (shown in light grey) we used the following classes of OSM: Residential, Commercial, 
Industrial, Military, Cemetery. In places where the flood wave colours overshadow those 
of the urban areas, one could consider the existence of city-like streets as a rough indicator 
of inhabited areas. 
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9 Appendix III – Maps related to Lake Level Sensitivity Analysis 
In this Appendix we show maps of the expected inundation in Baghdad, depending on the 
level of the lake when the breach occurs; as previously, the levels considered are 300, 
305, 307, 309, 319 (current level) and 330m (maximum level). 
Initial Lake 
level: 300m 
Initial Lake 
level: 305m 
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Initial Lake 
level: 307m 
Initial Lake 
level: 309m 
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Initial Lake 
level: 319m 
Initial Lake 
level: 330m 
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